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activity is, in many cases, just the fact that it is a step taken with the intention
of bringing about some harmful consequence.
Ill
Besides the topics I have mentioned much else is iluminatingly discussed in
this short book. Indeed the ratio of thoughts to words is astonishingly high -
a fact which imparts to many of Lady Wootton's observations an unforgettable
quality. This is especially true of her critical comments on the archaic atmos-
phere and conventional procedures of the English forensic process, many of
which, as she says, "seem incongruous in a scientific age." Few lawyers (on
either side of the Atlantic) will fail to enjoy and profit from Lady Wootton's
blend of wisdom, irreverence and wit.
H. L. A. HART*
*Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University.
TiE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUBJECTIVE
FAcTORS IN LAW, BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH GERMAN LAWYERS. By
Walter 0. Weyrauch.* Forward by Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. Mc-
Dougal. New Haven and London; Yale University Press, 1964. Pp. xvii,
316. $7.50.
THIS is an unusual, fascinating and troubling book. The author, now a Pro-
fessor of Law at the University of Florida, was from 1948 to 1952 a practicing
lawyer in Germany. He then moved to the United States, which he appears to
have found more congenial to his personality. A decisive period of the author's
American re-education was spent at the Yale Law School, where he was at-
tracted by the work, the research interests, and the methods of Harold Lass-
well and Myres McDougal. The author's interest in the ways in which society
actually functions, the roles played in it by the law and the lawyers, and the
devices by which democratic values may be strengthened by the law and its
manipulators has found expression in his earlier writings. The present book is
also centered around these questions.
Weyrauch, believing in the comparative method, approaches these questions
by drawing a collective portrait of the German lawyer. Express comparisons
with America are made in several places, but to what extent, if any, conclu-
sions about the United States can be drawn from Germany, remains doubtful.
The collective portrait of the German lawyer that emerges from Weyrauch's
inquiry is devastating. The author's method was to interview some German
lawyers in such a way that a free flow of associations would reveal essential
personality traits. As the interviews are reported, the subjects appear to have
*Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Florida.
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revealed themselves as a bunch of ranting malcontents. The statements appear
as outpourings of dissatisfaction with the law, with its administration and its
administrators, with Germany, with the United States, with the state of the
world, and with the nature of man. What also appears is a consistent craving
for prestige, status, rank and personal security, coupled with a pretended con-
tempt of monetary values and a scepticism or cynicism about morals. There is
hardly an expression of self-respect, of pride of profession, or of social respon-
sibility. The subjects appear egocentric, parochially narrow in their interests,
and even of moderate or low professional skill.
From the interviews it seems that all legal thinking is either sterile con-
ceptualism, or subjective hunch, or jockeying for power. The interviews give
no indication of that method of legal thought which typically appears in pres-
ent-day opinions of German courts and German legal writing. Old-style con-
ceptualism is by no means dead in Germany; it can be found there just as one
can find it here in the United States. One also suspects that hunch and power
play are as frequent here as they are there. But what characterizes more ac-
curately the modem legal writing of Germany, judicial and scholarly, is the
method of jurisprudence of interests which has also come to the fore in this
country as the New Jurisprudence, the Great Tradition, or sociological juris-
prudence. Of the wholesome predominance of this "realistic" method of legal
thought, we hardly find a trace in Weyrauch's interviews.
Can we then accept as correct the portrayal of the German lawyer that
emerges from the interviews? In the extended contacts which I have had with
members of the legal profession of Germany, I too have often heard statements
like those appearing in Weyrauch's interviews. But they are overbalanced by
many others of a positive character, especially indications of responsibility,
competency, personal satisfaction with the chosen way of life, and pride of
achievement, as well as upright morals.
Weyrauch describes in detail the method of his inquiry. It was carefully
thought out and, apparently, carried through with diligence and with aware-
ness of its possible pitfalls. The sample was not very large; 132 persons were
seen and some 70 of them were subjected to extensive interviews. That num-
ber is, however, larger than the number interviewed in several American at-
tempts to draw collective portraits of the politician or the practitioner of law.
With some reluctance I venture the expression of doubts as to Weyrauch's
findings. Did the subjects really reveal their personalities in his interviews?
Can any person's "real personality" be discovered by stimulating him to talk
in a free flow of association? In conversations with people, lawyers and others,
in the southern United States, I here observed time and again that the talk
would. almost inevitably turn to the race problem, no matter on what subject
one might begin - travel, people, world affairs or cooking. In Germany, people
seem to be under a compulsion to talk about the hardships, real or imaginary,
of the war years, the bombings, the expulsion from the eastern provinces, the
occupation, de-Nazification, etc. They also tend to talk about the protection,
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real or imaginary, they have given to individual Jews. And then they will air
their grievances, their disappointments, their doubts about themselves, Ger-
many, America and the world. Everything is bad, and if the subject is a law-
yer, he will vent his feelings against the law and against his brethren in the
craft. But the tune changes when the listener injects some kind word, when he
points, for instance, at some fine decision of a German court, at an eminent
piece of writing, or at an open-minded lawyer, judge or professor. Once the
German partner to the conversation is made to feel that one who comes from
outside, especially one who is of German background (and who can thus be
expected to understand things German), is sympathetic, a deeper layer of con-
sciousness, or unconsciousness (where is the borderline?), comes to the sur-
face. And that deeper layer is not regulated by self-abasement, cynicism, or
nihilism. At times the talk appears as an over-evaluation of the German Self.
But more often it is an objective evaluation of the subject's profession and of
his field, the law. The talk shifts from bitterness or facetiousness to positive
objectivity and seriousness of concern and evaluation.
In the searching analysis of his own qualification for the exploration of Ger-
man legal minds, Weyrauch repeatedly observes that his German partners
appeared eager to talk to him, because to them he was both an insider and an
outside observer. Weyrauch also states that he took special care to give free
rein to the subject's flow of association. I believe that it was exactly through
his reluctance to interrupt the subject's train of thought that the expression
of the thought was falsified.
Quite probably Weyrauch's subjects were as eager to hear words of encour-
agement and positive appreciation as any normal human being. Veyrauch's
desire to be scientific, however, prevented him from doing that which would
possibly have opened the door to that deeper layer which appears to be decisive
of personality.
The tendency to respond to a general conversational stimulus by negative
talk, by the utterance of grievances, by the verbalization of repressions, i.e., by
ranting and groveling, is a general human trait. It is aggravated in people
who, like the Germans, have been through shattering experiences or, who, like
the Germans or our Southerners, have profound feelings of collective guilt.
If one tries through interviews to learn about the personality of such in-
dividuals, one must not limit himself to the stimulation of free-flow conversa-
tion. One has to stimulate by the indication of sympathetic understanding the
confidence which allows the baring of that deeper layer which constitutes the
core of what may be called personality. Caution is thus appropriate in the
evaluation not only of personality studies but also of opinion polls based on
interviews which fail to pierce the subjects' protective shells.
I hesitate to accept the results of Weyrauch's interviews; nevertheless, I
recognize the significance of his enterprise. He has done pioneer work. He has
subjected the interview method of research in social psychology to a test which
was necessary to reveal its inadequacies, to indicate the need for its elaboration,
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and the ways in which such elaboration is to be sought. He has also given us
many instructive insights into the legal profession of Germany and the man-
ner in which it functions. But the more valuable of these insights are contained
not so much in the interviews as in the author's own text and annotations.
Perhaps one of the more important insights is that what a society expects
of its lawyers is not the same the world over. Lawyers do not have exactly the
same social functions in Germany and in the United States. Of course, here as
well as there, lawyers have to provide the framework of orderly rules and proc-
esses which are necessary for the smooth functioning of a complex society;
here, as there, lawyers are engaged in deciding cases, in advising clients, in
prosecuting persons suspected of crime. But, as Weyrauch points out, in the
United States the legal profession is practically co-extensive with the Bar,
while in Germany the various branches of the legal profession are rigidly
separate from each other. A young man who wishes to be a judge enters a
career service without having first joined the Bar. Here the attorney, in Ger-
many the judge together with the high ranking civil servant, is the central
figure of the legal profession. Legal education is geared toward the training of
future administrators and judges rather than to that of training future attor-
neys. Entering the public service as an administrator or a judge has tradition-
ally meant the assumption of a special status in society rather than entering
upon a simple relation of employment. In the traditional German society, so-
cial position was determined by the rank one occupied in the public service.
These traditions have been shattered. What is now to determine a man's social
standing? Income, education, civic merit, or what else? No firm new frame-
work has yet developed. How is one who has grown up in the old order to find
his place in the new, the shape of which has not yet fully emerged? No wonder
that one finds "schizoid" personalities. No wonder also that conclusions are
hard to transfer from one of the two countries to the other.
MAx RHENSTEmwf
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